As a creator and purveyor of security awareness, it has always been my position that there is no such thing as too much awareness or the need to be alert and attentive to the possibilities of an untoward or adverse event. So I can appreciate the fact that the TSA or Department of Homeland Security wants to make us aware of new and impending threats to our safety. But in this day of Threat Advisories, patdowns, three ounce liquid limitations, X-Ray scanners and the like, I believe that we have finally crossed the line into the surreal.
Two events this month have made airline security like the annual Simpsons Halloween special. (For non-Simpsons fans, this is the one annual episode where the show takes on a bizarre plot line and completely abandons any pretense of being realistic.)
On January 5th, while over Canada en route to Germany, an airplane's radio went awry, and the pilot thought he put the “No Radio” code (7600) in the transponder but mistakenly entered the code ‘7500’, which means "hijacking or unlawful interference". The crew ultimately confirmed that the issue was a communication issue and not a hijacking. The plane was ultimately diverted to Toronto however. What caused the ruckus? One of the pilots spilled some coffee on the console due to some turbulence, and while trying to clean up the mess the pilot entered the wrong code.
The second story, a day later, was a case where a Florida professor was arrested and removed from a plane after fellow passengers alerted crew members they thought he had a suspicious package in the overhead which was “making suspicious sounds.” That "suspicious package" turned out to be a set of keys, a hat, and a bagel with cream cheese. He was removed from the plane because he took exception to the crew’s questioning, probably reminiscent of the KGB (Where are your papers?!) and was ultimately handcuffed. Note to self: always order the ‘noiseless’ cream cheese.
(I am not even going to tell you about the passenger on a flight from Fort Lauderdale to Denver who was pulled off a plane last week after other passengers said he was “taking too many bathroom breaks”!)
Because of the deluge of awareness warnings and veiled threats to your safety, we have become so prone to over-reacting that now we all jump if we here a loud sound in the airport. Even in the subways in NYC we are urged that if we "see something" we should "say something." Average citizens have become deputized Barney Fife’s with no accountability but plenty of assumed authority, as the bagel and bathroom cases above suggest. Passengers have become the de facto authorities of suspicious or terrorist activities on planes all of a sudden. Now I know that many real threats have been thwarted or suspects captured with the help of average citizens who report tips, but imagine the inundation of false and ridiculous leads law enforcement have to follow-up on when you request the aid of amateurs. As a Muslim man, you almost couldn't get on a plane in the US after 9/11 due to the hysterics that followed. And God forbid if you were flying with a few of your friends.
The Department of Homeland security has five levels of alerts: Low = Green; Guarded = Blue; Elevated = Yellow; High = Orange; Severe = Red. Since the introduction of the system in 2002, we have never had a Green or Blue status, only Yellow, Orange and Red. Do you know how many times it has been changed since 2002? No? Why would you? Do you get to keep your shoes on instead at the airport when the threat is lowered? No. Do you see any real improvement in security after they raise the threat? Not really, but you do see some procedural changes in which the government and TSA react to the last threat - not necessarily a future, possible threat. How many other shoe bombers have we had since Richard Reid? (None) How many additional underwear bombers have we had since the Underpants of Mass Destruction attempt (None) Boxcutters? You get my point... (By the way the Threat Level has been changed 16 times since 2002).
If I have learned anything about security awareness training and campaigns is that though people can deal with the constant reinforcement of subtle awareness messages, people quickly become desensitized to hysterical warnings, especially if they see no immediate crisis to warrant the warnings. The most effective training, in my opinion, is to mete out the awareness with intelligent, well-reasoned arguments about what is the best behavior and what the possible risks might be. Both 'Chicken Little' and 'The Boy Who Cried Wolf' approaches are proven dead-ends.
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